The tales from the Italian Front.

The tales from the Italian Front

The legend about Sepp Innerkofler

During the war both sides were using the services of the people living in the mountains, as they know the tracks, all the remote places, the mountains in general, the weather there and the right behavior, necessary to survive. 

 

Sepp Innerkofler was one of them, the people who were called „Bergführer“ (a mountain guide). He was considered as the most experienced mountain guide on the Austro-Hungarian side of the front. All the mountains in the Sexten area were conquered by him, and mostly he was the very first man on the top of them.  

Sepp Innerkofler

From the beginning of the war, he was a scarifying nightmare for the Italians. The patrols he leads were almost invisible ones; he and his men were moving through the mountains like the ghosts. He appeared suddenly in the remote mountain posts and, together with his men, he was spreading the death and the fear among the Italians. His favorite place was the massif known as Drei Zinnen and the country around it.  

 Sepp Innerkofler (center) and his "flying patrol".

From the first days of the war this was clear that the Italians would be trying to advance through Forcella Lavaredo pass. The highest mountain nearby was Paternkofel  (2744m) - all the people who were familiar with the mountains in the Austro-Hungarian army were convinced that a post had to be build there. Sepp with his men already went there one day, and they confirmed that the mountain was not captured by Italians so far. While being on the top of Paternkofel Sepp has realized that the mountain was so close to Austro-Hungarian positions, that any Italian patrol might be a deadly threat for Austrian troops. Together with some others mountain guides he was trying to persuade this to their captain, but he was not from the mountains and didn’t understand them – it seemed too crazy for him to build such remote position and he couldn’t find any sense in Sepp’s words.

War in the Dolomites.

The time went by...  Sepp was still on the move with his patrol men - they conquered Elferkofel (3093m) and Hohbrunnerschneid (3045m). The information he gained during those reconnaissance missions were noticed by the high command and he was awarded a medal.

Unfortunately his bad thoughts became a reality one day.  A small stone wall was spotted at the top of Paternkofel and the first shots were fired from the top of the mountain. The Italian post at Paternkofel was able to see each and every move of Austro-Hungarian troops below and soon there was no possibility for Austrians to move during the daylight.

 

On 4th of July Sepp and six of his men began their suicide mission. Sepp knew that this was one of the most dangerous tasks in his life. Using the most complicated and dangerous way, in the cold dark night, seven Austrians were climbing to the top of the Paternkofel. They done this climbing task perfectly - no single sound was heard and no one spotted them. 

 Paternkofel today

Below, at the pass, the Austro-Hungarian soldiers were waiting impatiently. In the morning light they have seen a silhouette of a tall, big man who was going to the very peak of the mountain. They have seen (but not heard) him throwing one grenade, then the second one, and another... Suddenly, above Sepp and at the very top of Paternkofel they saw another silhouette, it seemed to be even bigger than Sepp. They have seen this man throwing the piece of rock at Sepp, they seen the rock hitting Innerkofler... and Sepp has fallen down. This was a sudden end of the incredible duel at the top of the mountain - Paternkofel was still Italian.

This is one of the stories about this duel, but the reality is little more complicated. Some of the witnesses were claiming that Sepp was shot by the enemy, some of them were claiming that the deadly bullet was fired from Austro-Hungarian machine gun (When that big Italian was spotted, one of Austro-Hungarian machine guns started firing. The fire was immediately ceased by the commanding officer, but it was too late for Sepp.).

Sepp was buried at the top of Paternkofel. The Italians made a grave in the rock, using some explosives. He was lying there 3 years, then his body was moved to the cemetery in his village. Sepp’s son, who was at the exhumation and then assisted during moving of Sepp‘s body from Paternkofel to the valley, confirmed that his skull was hit by two bullets. This means probably that the version with Austro-Hungarian machine gun that killed Sepp is the right one.  

 At the top of Paternkofel - most probably this is a photo taken during the exhumation of Sepp's body.

Today there are many stories, both Austrian and Italian, about Sepp  – but doesn’t matter how they describe his death, all those stories are telling the same: he was the man who loved the mountains and he was the hero from Paternkofel.

The plate at Sepp Innerkofler's family house.

 

The Italian who was fighting with Sepp at the top of Paternkofel was Pierro de Luca. Today the way to  Paternkofel is named after Innerkofler and de Luca – two people who were born in the mountains, loved the mountains, and were forced to fight there.

Viktor Savs and his secret.

Viktor Savs was a soldier of Innsbruck 2nd Battalion. He enlisted at the age of 16, following his father - Peter Savs. It was not allowed for such young man to enlist, so a special permission, issued by archduke Eugen (the supreme commander of the armies on the Italian front) had to be arranged.

 V. Savs

Viktor, as most people who were born in the highland, loved the mountains. He was trying to be ordered the tasks that allowed him to do what he liked the much – and this meant skiing. Viktor was  escorting the packhorses and carrying messages as runner that was wandering the mountains day by day. Such tasks were pretty enough for the boy 16 years old, but Viktor also seen the real fight many times, especially at Zinnen plateau and Sextener Stinnen. One day he was escorting more than 20 Italian POWs, all alone! His service was noticed and he was awarded at least three times.

 

27th May 1917 was a very bad day for Viktor – one of the shells exploded above him and the avalanche of stones badly wounded his leg. Stuck under the stones he was trying to cut the leg off, to set free from the stones!

Viktor was sent to the hospital at Silian, finally his leg was cut off under the knee – but this was nothing special during the war time. What really surprised everyone, was his secret that was revealed in the hospital. Viktor was... a woman! Yes, her real name was Victoria Savs, and only a few staff officers knew about it before this accident. 

 V. Savs with her father.

 

Our brave heroine survived the Great War. She died in 1979 at age 80, in Salzburg.

Lt. Grosse and his platoon. 

A valley called Forcella Fontana Negra (2545m) was the place where Lieutenant Grosse and his 60 men were sent – their task was to defend this remote post. They had to stay there 8 days and then another platoon had to go there and do change them.

Fontana Negra during the war.

Lieutenant Grosse was an intelligent, courageous and clever soldier. He was not afraid of the Italians, his only worry was how to organize the defense at this post. He has checked the mountains around, found the possible threats from the enemy’s side and organized the posts around. He and his men were waiting now.

But there was another problem that made him worry and this was the shortage of his supplies. The only way to their position started at Wolf-Glanvell hut and part of this way was a vertical rock wall - the only way was to climb it using the metal stacks that were hammered into the wall. It was a deadly game for each and every soldier who was climbing it with all the equipment and ammunition on his back.  

Grosse had no other choice than to order that they must save the ammunition – it was allowed to shoot only if one was sure to hit the target. Their first day there was rather calm, and the same was during  the second. A fire from the Italian side was chaotic and rare. During the night the supplies finally arrived and the Austrians were waiting patiently for the next day.

Landesschützen Unterjäger

On the third day the inferno began – from the morning the Italian machine guns were shooting at Austro-Hungarian positions with no mercy. And there was no break in the fire. Two Italian battalions were attacking the position defended by Grosse and his platoon. The whole day the Austrian platoon was under the fire and Italians were attacking continuously – but with no success. Grosse’s men in their good positions were able to keep on the defensing their line for a long time, but just during this one day 1/3 of their ammunition were used. Grosse had send two soldiers down, to ask for the immediate supplying – unfortunately they were shot by the Italians on their way down. Unfortunately, Grosse and his men didn’t see it and they didn’t know they have failed – hopefully they were waiting for the supplies to arrive. 

The Italians were trying to climb one mountain nearby - Tofana I, and then use this position to attack the Austrians from the above. They were spotted on the way there and for most of them this was their last way - the Austrian machine gun crews knew very well how to use their deadly weapon. But the Italians were still trying to get there. Finally they have reached the remote Austrian post at Tofana I. Four Austrians were easily outnumbered – desperately trying to defend their position, they were fighting to the very end. 

Tofana in 1917.

The Italians and the Austrians were so close now, that hand grenade was better weapon than the rifle. The explosions were everywhere around, the rocks and shrapnel were flying through the air. Grosse was wounded, he cannot move his left hand but he was still fighting. Supporting his rifle on the rocks he was still shooting, using only his right hand. 

The night was there, and it meant another Italian attack. Thirty Austrians were still fighting, without any break from the previous morning and finally the Italians had to withdraw again.

After this night attack there were only 16 of Austrians left alive. Grosse was lying on the ground, with his leg wounded. Once again his soldiers arranged a position for their lieutenant, laying him among the rocks – he was still able to fire his rifle. They knew the end is near – there were only 30 bullets left... another Italian attack, the last bullets were fired and Italians withdraw again.

And this was the end. The Austrians have destroyed their rifles and were waiting calmly for the next wave of the enemy. The Italians have noticed the Austrian fire ceased and they came there in silence, with no signs of the triumph. A small group of Grosse‘s men became Italian POWs.

The Italians have won this time, but their joy lasted only for a moment. They regrouped and advanced, but soon they realized that Austro-Hungarian posts were again defended, as the reinforcements arrived just at this very moment. The battle of Forcella Fontana Negra has started from the beginning.

Lt. Wendland and the machine gun.

Punta Dei Bois (2657m) was the mountain standing alone, more than 300m over the positions of two fighting armies at the saddle known as Forcella dei Bois (2330m).

 A lone sentry somewhere in the Dolomites.

It took one hour to climb all the way to the top of the mountain - through the maze of ice, snow and rocks. This remote place was a „home“ for Lieutenant Wendland, his 18 men and one machine gun. The conditions there were harsh. Day by day they had to carry all the supplies using this dangerous route but they liked their post. The mountains there were beautiful and this was all they need to feel pleasured.  The view from the peak was really amazing – a distant valleys on the Italian side, Italian plateaux and the sea on the horizon. 

The landscape was fascinating there but they didn’t forget about the war. Their post allowed them to control the Italian war road to Falzarego. They used the machine gun to fire at this road, very often their fire made this route impossible to use for a long time, both day and night. This was not acceptable for the Italians and they decided to capture the mountain.

The first attempt was made during the night and one of the most dangerous ways to reach the top was chosen by the Alpini. However this was not a lucky night for the Italians – the night guard has heard them and the Austrians were prepared. Wendland fired at the first of the climbing Italians and he felt down, taking all his followers with him. They all felt 300m down the rocky wall.  

The Austro-Hungarian position with a mountain gun at 3360m.

The Italians have tried one more time. This time a very small group, maybe only two or three soldiers, climbed Tofana – the mountain that was above the Wendland’s post. They wanted to throw some grenades  from the above, making the Austrians to leave their post. At the first moment it seemed they have succeed – the Austrians were surprised but soon the Italian post was spotted and some shots have eliminated this danger. All Italians were killed. 

One of the following days was a misty one. The valleys around were all covered by mist and nothing could be seen. Wendland knew that this was the perfect day to attack his position again. He was continuously looking down the valley with the binocular and suddenly he saw some shadows in the mist. The machine gun was ready next to him - together with the first beams of the morning sunlight Wendland pressed the trigger and his machine gun started to sing its lethal song.

 A mountain remote post in the Dolomites.

All Austro-Hungarian positions were alarmed and they were ready to defense the positions but there was no reason to do anything. Wendland was still shooting, his machine gun alone was enough to reap the deadly harvest. The Italians were trying to regroup, then they were trying to attack again – but they cannot pass the curtain of iron from that single machine gun. Hundreds of them were dead and they had to withdraw.

Only when there were no Italians in sight, Lieutenant Wendland could stop firing. The machine gun was almost red from the heat, there was smoke over the barrel and the boiled water was dropping down from the radiator. 

(The information that became a base of those stories were found in the book "The Front in the Dolomites 1915-1917", by Milan Cepelka).

(JD)

The Russian Army before World War 1

Introduction

The Russian army has had a long history with many successes such as those in the Russo-Swedish war and in particular over Napoleon. However in 1906 its fortunes had reached something of a nadir. Humiliated by defeat against Japan in the Russo-Japanese war, even its staunchest supporters recognised that change needed to come; particularly given the European situation where Tsarist Russia was aligned with Republican France against the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires. This post details the issues it faced and how prepared it was for World War 1.

Politics

Political reforms were taking place. The revolution of 1905 convinced the Tsar and his ministers that change was necessary and as a result, a Duma was created, freedom of speech and assembly was granted and even restrictions against the Jews were lifted.

Economics

The industrial advances of the 1800’s and early 1900’s had had a significant impact on war making. Artillery could fire faster and at much longer ranges. Infantry fire power had rapidly increased and the influence of cavalry was much diminished. In the Russo-Japanese war, Russian officers recognised that small groups of Japanese infantry had defeated charging Cossacks but rather than accepting this as a result of the increase in infantry fire power, they argued that the Cossacks had been cowardly and henceforth were made to rely on the sabre. The supply situation was so chaotic that even three years after the war soldiers still did not have their iron rations. Such events convinced even the staunchest generals against change that it was now necessary.

Political reform also coincided with rapid economic growth. Years of railway construction and foreign investment had an impact as well as an extra 2,500 million roubles of government spending.  Russia reduced her dependence on foreign investment from a half in 1904-1905 to an eighth in 1914. A clear sign of this growth is seen from the fact that government revenue nearly doubled in the last 15 years before WW1 to 3,500 million roubles.

Army Structure

There was a clear division in the officer class. Unlike many Western European countries, the army was a refuge for social mobility. Russia did not have a large middle class and so needed ambitious peasants to fill lower ranked officer positions. Attempts had been made to confine officer posts to the nobility in the past but these attempts had usually broken down due to a lack of numbers.

This led to officers who sought to change the system, by applying the lessons of the Russo-Japanese war. However, there were strong centres of reaction; notably the artillery and the cavalry, notably represented by the Grand Dukes Mikhailovitch and Nicholas. For example by 1906 it was clear than an 8 gun battery was too large and that due to advances in rate of fire, a 6 gun battery could do the same job. Whilst the artillerists agreed this was so, albeit reluctantly, they were not eager to act. In part this was because an 8 gun battery was commanded by a senior officer whereas a 6 gun battery would be commanded by a captain. With promotions and pensions at stake, the artillerists obstructed the matter so that by 1914, the batteries were still 8 gun affairs, which contributed to the infamous shell shortage.

Whilst the economic boom provided the army with a wealth of material, it still had to adapt to warfare in the 20^th century. It had to change a social and administrative heritage of backwardness. Warfare had changed. Armies were larger. It was no longer enough to drill soldiers on a parade ground. They needed more complex skills. Officers needed trigonometry more than courage and a body of highly educated officers was needed to study war in its higher aspects; namely a general staff. Even so, Russian soldiers were taught two manoeuvres; forward and back. It was feared that anything for more complicated would cause confusion, particularly under fire.

The disasters of 1905 led to the creation of a general staff but it was small and its functions were not well defined. It had a torrid time trying to make any impact on an army with a large bureaucratic structure where administrators who could work the system had the most success.

These wrangles discredited the General Staff in the eyes of the Duma as after 3 years there was little progress. As such, this fuelled demands for a navy. Naval leaders appeared to have an air of competence that was lacking in army men. A navy was expensive however, at 40 million roubles a dreadnought. Army leaders combined to head off such demands but could not decide what to do with the money thus saved. Grand Duke Sergey, of the artillery, wanted more guns and Grand Duke Nicholas desired more cavalry.

It was said during the war that Russia lost battles in part because of a lack of heavy artillery. The truth of the matter is that Russia had plenty of heavy guns, but the vast majority were situated in the fortresses. Furthermore, they declared that high trajectory artillery was a ‘coward’s weapon’ and that infantry should not expect artillery to lob shells behind fortifications when they could charge them. The General Staff sent a representative to high level artillery meetings but they deliberately made discussions highly technical until the representative disappeared.

Sukhomlinov

To try to resume progress, the Tsar appointed Sukhomlinov as Chief of the General Staff. He has had something of a bad press, being regarded corrupt and incompetent. The government arrested him in 1915 for corruption, as did the Provisional Government though ironically the Bolsheviks released him.

However the case against him is not strong. He made several enemies amongst the upper class officers by promoting lower class officers, pruning the privileges of the Guard Corps and by taking over some of the tasks of the Inspectors General. It was said by artillerists that he really wanted 6 gun batteries in order to make posts for his lower class clients. His assistant, Danilov, was regarded as an ‘agrarian revolutionary’. To continue his reforms, he needed better control of the promotions machinery. Higher promotions were a matter for the higher attestations committee and as such, outside his remit. Promotions lower down were a matter for the war ministry which he was able to seize via intrigue.

However in wartime, power moved from the administrators to the commanders in the field and military districts but both sides would try to cancel each other out through promotions. It was often such that a commander would hardly speak to his chief of staff but would have excellent relations with his quartermaster general. In I army, its commander Rennenkampf was an aristocratic cavalry man who refused to speak to his chief of staff Mileant but had good relations with his quarter-master-general Bayov. Both sides would seek to discredit opposing appointments but officers, if dismissed, would be caught in each other’s safety net. Divisional commanders, dismissed for inefficiency, could end up commanding corps. This did not help the army improve the quality of its officers. It was said that the army had the power to dismiss but not to appoint.

Sukhominlov’s reforms were aided by Russia’s economic recovery and between 1909 and 1913, some 3,000 million roubles were found for the army. By 1913-1914, the Russian army was receiving more money than the German army though it is likely the German army got a lot more for its money than the Russian army. The Germans noted with alarm in 1914 that the Russian recovery from the disasters of the Russo-Japanese war was almost complete.

It was said that Sukhomlinov was corrupt but the reality was that there was a good deal of confusion how the money should be spent. Often the infrastructure was not in place for a particular project. For example, money given by the Duma for ship building was in part spent on ice breakers, dredgers and light houses. It is said that he fell victim to development economics rather than corruption.

There were many obstacles to reform which hindered the Russian army. Sukhomlinov proposed the creation of reserve divisions, formed by detaching a group of officers and men from each corps and using reservists. Germany had such a system in which an army corps could form a reserve division. This was a good system if one did not want the expense of maintaining many divisions in peacetime but many Russian generals regarded these divisions as useless and artillerists tried to ensure that guns were not ‘wasted’ on them.

Fortresses

He also suggested that the Russian fortresses should be raised. In the late nineteenth century, fortresses were built in western Russia and Poland to offset the difference between the Russian and German mobilisations. However, by 1910, the fortresses were obsolete and were often made of brick. Heavy artillery and even field guns could destroy them. His opponents were aghast and demanded that they should be built up, rather than broken up. World war one showed the futility of this as all fortresses fell in a matter of days, with few exceptions such as Pryzmysl which was really defended by mud and Verdun which was defended from trenches. His opponents were eventually successful and by 1912 the programme of razing had to be abandoned. This meant that even more heavy artillery was placed in fortresses rather than for use by the field army. In 1915 when the fortresses were supposed to save Russia, they collapsed in a matter of days and the Germans captured hundred of guns and millions of shells whilst the Russian army, lacking mobile heavy artillery, could only retreat.

Planning for War

The saving of the fortresses had an impact of Russia’s plans for war. Russian fortresses were thought essential as the Germans could mobilise far quicker than the Russians, who planned to situate most of their troops well inside Russia. Poland was to be abandoned as it jutted out into Central Power territory. However, this lack of action was deemed inadmissible by 1909 as the Bosnian crisis had shown there was strong hostility between Russia and Germany.

In 1910, Sukhomlinov and Danilov rewrote this plan. They felt the Russian army needed to take to the offensive as early as possible to save the French from defeat. Attacking from Poland was risky to counter attack from East Prussia or Galicia so one of these bastions needed to be taken out. Austria-Hungary would not influence the first period of the war so East Prussia was chosen as the target. East Prussia could be attacked from the South and the East but the two were separated by a line of lakes. Danilov allotted four of Russia’s seven armies to an East Prussian offensive, leaving three for Austria-Hungary.

There was a huge outcry as commanders in the military districts and Sukhomlinov’s enemies opposed it. Some felt it would be better to take out Austria-Hungary first as she was the weakest opponent. Also, some argued that the Southern army could be taken in the rear by Austria-Hungary as early as the 20^th day of mobilisation. Such ideas were pure fantasy (although sometimes replicated by the Austro-Hungarian General Staff) as by this day, they were a considerable distance behind their own borders. Nevertheless, the opponents succeeded in changing the plan. Two of the four armies allotted to East Prussia were now moved south to attack Austria-Hungary. This was dangerous because the two missing armies were intended to provide flank protection (from the fortresses of Konigsberg and Thorn) for the two attacking armies. Their absence meant that coordination between the two armies needed to be very strong to prevent the Germans from attacking each one separately.

Thus by 1912 the Russian army was split between the two operations; against East Prussia and Austria-Hungary. Russian weakness was not shown by Danilov’s plan, but rather the upsetting of it as it highlighted the lack of unity in the army.

Conclusion

In conclusion it has been shown that Russia was not economically backward as vast amounts of money were made available to the army before the war. It suffered from administrative mismanagement and a lack of understanding as to what the next war would be like. It also suffered from an ideological split between the aristocratic side of which Grand Duke Nicholas was a member and between the Sukhomlinovsky who were for reform. This had an impact of the equipment the army was provided, such as a lack of mobile heavy artillery, and through its war plans as the two operations were separate and neither had enough strength to ensure success. This substantially contributed to the Russian wartime defeat.

References

Much of this work is taken from Norman Stone’s ‘The Eastern Front 1914-1917’.

(ES)

How to win the war? - strategic plans for victory (part one).

How to win the war? - the strategic plans for victory (part one).
The second Schlieffen's plan of 1905.

Alfred Graf von Schlieffen, 28 February 1833 – 4 January 1913 

was a German filed marshal and strategist who served as Chief 

of the Imperial German General Staff from 1891 to 1906.

In 1905 Schlieffen got the conclusion that it would be very hard, if not impossible at all, to defeat the French army with the frontal attack heading west. One of the reasons was that the main French army was protected by the fortification line, even if the German forces would split in two strong formations (according to his first plan from 1900).  

Schlieffen has found the solution – the northern part of the French army must be surrounded and broken. And the way to do it is to move the huge German formation to the north, across Belgium.  The key factor was that this formation had to be strong enough to defeat the northern part of the French army at any circumstances. No matter where the French armies would be, no matter how long it could take to march throughout Belgium and how many reinforcements could be sent to the north. According to this task, that formation cannot be shaped as a spear, it had to be like a roller.

The Schlieffen plan from 1905 and Moltke's plan from 1914. 

(from Wilhelm Groener's Schlieffen Plan).

Another question was how strong such formation should be, how many troops are necessary to achieve the expected results. Schlieffen was not sure at the beginning but later the decision was made. 7/8 of the whole German forces were expected to be used at the western front, while only 1/8 was left to protect the eastern border. Such decision was not easy – the enemy on the east was the Russian Empire, with more than hundred million people. There was an ally, Austro-Hungary, that would support Germany on the eastern front, but was the Austro-Hungarian army strong enough to last out the Russian attack? This was not an easy question, but Schlieffen’s reasoning was cold and logical.

First of all, the Russian mobilization will not be as quick as German and Austro-Hungarian one. The estimation was that it would be finished when Belgium would be already defeated and German forces would be fighting with the main French forces already. Secondly, even if the Russians would be ready to start their offensive, the road to Berlin would be not quick and easy. They cannot go directly to Berlin as there are two flanks with the concentration of German and Austro-Hungarian troops: Eastern Prussia and Galicia. If they would be left there, they could attack the main Russian forces from the flank anytime and bring the advance to the halt. And last, but not least – even if the Russians somehow manage to solve the above mentioned problems, they still have to defeat the Austro-Hungarian armies in Carpathian and occupy the East Prussia. Only then they could go forward to Berlin.  All of those tasks are not impossible for the Russians, but they require time – a long time, according to the poor railway system on the east. 

Schlieffen’s logic had won here – he has considered all “pros” and “cons” and had decided that it was worth the risk. There was only one more question – the possible protest of Austro-Hungary on leaving them almost alone. But Schlieffen had the answer – “the fate of Austria will be decided at Seine, not Vistula”.

Now it was the right time to think about the details of that plan. The first question was the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, but it wasn’t a real problem. The real trouble was that Schlieffen really needed all the possible forces to be a northern part of this roller. This meant the area of southern Germany, from Metz to the Swiss border, was protected only by five corps. 

What if the French forces will start their advance immediately? What if they break the weak defense here and advance to the Bayern, or to Berlin? What if they turn north, cutting off the German roller from the supply lines? How strong Schlieffen was to be able to answer all those questions:  ”No, I can still manage this. Nothing can be moved from the main northern forces to make the defense of southern Germany stronger.” And he knew that if any of the French forces would advance on the south, it automatically would make the northern flank much weaker – this was exactly what he expected. On the other hand, he was sure that at the moment he moved his armies across Belgium, all French forces would move to the north, being ready to stop the advance of the German roller. This meant there would not be any French offensive on the southern flank. 

The reality in 1914 was exactly according to his foreseeing. The French pressure on the south weakened shortly, as all the possible troops were moved to the north to stop German advance.

This is the main reason between Schlieffen and Moltke. Schlieffen himself was strong enough to fight for keeping all the conditions of his plan without any changes. His logical minds had calculated all the possible risks and draw the conclusions. Sometimes it seemed that the plan couldn’t work, but he was able to resist the temptation of moving the forces from the north to other, not so important, places: southern Germany or protection of the supply lines. The German roller had to be powerful, quickly advancing and it had to defeat the French army no matter how strong it would be in defense. 

Helmuth Johann Ludwig von Moltke ; 23 May 1848 – 18 June 1916),

 also known as "Moltke the Younger"

The numbers shows it clearly – Schlieffen’s main forces were the equivalent of more than 50 corps. Moltke has only 33 of them and during the war made his forces even weaker, by moving two corps from the western front to East Prussia, just before the Battle of the Marne. The forces Moltke has left on the south, to protect German borders, were two times bigger than the forces Schlieffen designed for the same task. Only 2/8 of the whole German army was left for all defensive tasks on all fronts, 6/8 of the German army was concentrated from Metz to Aachen and ready to defeat France.

Schlieffen’s second plan is the best example of the military plan with clear idea, one main task, and concentration of all the forces to achieve that goal. This doesn’t mean that Schlieffen’s plan, if not altered by Moltke, was the guarantee to win the war – but the first months of the Great War could be completely different if the plan would stay in its previous shape.

There is only one question – how Schlieffen wanted to create such amazing forces. More than 65 corps in total was the force that Germany couldn’t mobilize at this time. But this is another story…

(JD)